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WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS AND JAMES TOBIN
YALE UNIVERSITY
A long decade ago economic growth was the reigning fashion of polit-
ical economy. It was simultaneously the hottest subject of economic
theory and research, a slogan eagerly claimed by politicians of all
stripes, and a serious objective of the policies of governments. The
climate of opinion has changed dramatically. Disillusioned critics indict
both economic science and economic policy for blind obeisance to ag-
gregate material "progress," and for neglect of its costly side effects.
Growth, it is rharged, distorts national priorities, worsens the distribu-
tion of income, and irreparably damages the environment. Paul Erlich
speaks for a multitude when he says, "We must acquire a life style
which has as its goal maximum freedom and happiness for the individ-
ual, not a maximum Gross National Product."
Growth was in an important sense a discovery of economics after
the Second World War. Of course economic development has always
been the grand theme of historically minded scholars of large mind and
bold concept, notably Marx, Schumpeter, Kuznets. But the mainstream
of economic analysis was not comfortable with phenomena of change
and progress. The stationary state was the long-run equilibrium of
classical and neoclassical theory, and comparison of alternative static
equilibriums was the most powerful theoretical tool. Technological
change and population increase were most readily accommodated as
one-time exogenous shocks; comparative static analysis could be used
to tell how they altered the equilibrium of the system. The obvious fact
that these "shocks" were occurring continuously, never allowing the
NOTE: The research described in this paper was carried out under grants from
the National Science Foundation and the Ford Foundation. The paper and its
appendixes were originally published in Economic Growth, Fiftieth Anniver-
sary Colloquium V, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972;
the paper is reproduced here as it appeared in the colloquium volume. All ref-
erences to the appendixes pertain to that publication.
The paper is published in this volume upon recommendation of the Execu-
tive Committee and approval by the National Bureau of Economic Research
because it stimulated considerable discussion at the conference, some of which
is reproduced here.It was invited for presentation when an earlier paper by
another author was not forthcoming, and most importantly because of its special
relevance to the subject of this conference.
We would like to express our appreciation to Walter Dolde, James Pugash,
Geoffrey Woglom, Hugh Tobin, and especially Laura Harrison, for assistance
in the preparation of this paper. We are grateful to Robin Matthews for point-
ing out some problems in our treatment of leisure in the first draft.510Amenitiesand Disamenities of Economic Growth
system to reach its equilibrium, was a considerable embarrassment.
Keynesian theory fell in the same tradition, attempting rather awk-
wardly, though nonetheless fruitfully, to apply static equilibrium theory
to the essentially dynamic problem of saving and capital accumulation.
Sir Roy Harrod in 1940 began the process, brought to fruition by
many theorists in the 1950s, of putting the stationary state into motion.
The long-run equilibrium of the system became a path of steady growth,
and the tools of comparative statics could then be applied to alterna-
tive growth paths rather than to alternative stationary states. Neo-
Keynesian macroeconomics began to fall into place as a description of
departures from equilibrium growth, although this task of reinterpreta-
tion and integration is still far from a satisfactory completion.
By now modern neoclassical growth theory is well enough for-
mulated to have made its way into textbooks. It is a theory of the
growth of potential output, or output at a uniform standard rate of uti-
lization of capacity. The theory relates potential output to three de-
terminants: the labor force, the state of technology, and the stock of
human and tangible capital. The first two are usually assumed to grow
smoothly at rates determined exogenously by noneconomic factors.
The accumulation of capital is governed by the thrift of the population,
and in equilibrium the growth of the capital stock matches the growth
of labor-cum-technology and the growth of output. Simple as it is, the
model fits the observed trends of economic growth reasonably well.
The steady equilibrium growth of modern neoclassical theory is,
it must be acknowledged, a routine process of replication. It is a dull
story compared to the convulsive structural, technological, and social
changes described by the historically oriented scholars of development
mentioned above. The theory conceals, either in aggregation or in the
abstract generality of multisector models, all the drama of the events
—therise and fall of products, technologies, and industries, and the
accompanying transformations of the spatial and occupational distri-
bution of the population. Many economists agree with the broad out-
lines of Schumpeter's vision of capitalist development, which is a far
cry from growth models made nowadays in either Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, or Cambridge, England. But visions of that kind have yet to
be transformed into a theory that can be applied in everyday analytic
and empirical work.
In any case, growth of some kind is now the recognized economic
norm. A symptom of the change in outlook can be found in business
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inwhich aggregate productive activity was declining. Since 1960 it has
become increasingly customary to describe the state of the economy
by the gap between its actual output and its growing potential. Al-
though the word recession is still a source of confusion and contro-
versy, almost everyone recognizes that the economy is losing ground
—whichwill have to be recaptured eventually —wheneverits actual
rate of expansion is below the rate of growth of potential output.
In the early 1960s growth became a proclaimed objective of gov-
ernment policy, in this country as elsewhere. Who could be against it?
But like most value-laden words, growth has meant different things to
different people and at different times. Often growth policy was simply
identified with measures to expand aggregate demand in order to bring
or keep actual output in line with potential output. In this sense it is
simply stabilization policy, only more gap-conscious and growth-con-
scious than the cycle-smoothing policies of the past.
To economists schooled in postwar neoclassical growth theory,
growth policy proper meant something more than this, and more de-
batable. It meant deliberate effort to speed up the growth of potential
output itself, specifically to accelerate the productivity of labor. Growth
policy in this meaning was not widely understood or accepted. The
neoclassical model outlined above suggested two kinds of policies to
foster growth, possibly interrelated: measures that advanced techno-
logical knowledge and measures that increased the share of potential
output devoted to accumulation of physical or human capital.' Another
implication of the standard model was that, unless someone could find
a way to accelerate technological progress permanently, policy could
not raise the rate of growth permanently. One-shot measures would
speed up growth temporarily, for years or decades. But once the econ-
omy had absorbed these measures, its future growth rate would be
limited once again by constraints of labor and technology. The level
of its path, however, would be permanently higher than if the policies
had not been undertaken.
Growth measures nearly always involve diversions of current re-
sources from other uses, sacrifices of current consumption for the ben-
efit of succeeding generations of consumers. Enthusiasts for faster
'The variety of possible measures, and the difficulty of raising the growth rate by
more than one or two percentage points, have been explored by Edward Denison in his
influential study, TheSources ofEconomic Growth in the United States and the Alter-
natives Before Us, New York, Committee for Economic Development, January 1962,
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growth are advocates of the future against the present. Their case rests
on the view that in a market economy left to itself, the future would be
shortchanged because too small a fraction of current output would be
saved. We mention this point now because we shall return later to the
ironical fact that the antigrowth men of the 1970s believe that it is they
who represent the claims of a fragile future against a voracious present.
Like the enthusiasts to whom they are a reaction, current critics
of growth are disenchanted with both theory and policy, with both the
descriptive and the normative implications of the doctrines of the pre-
vious decade. The sources of disenchantment are worth considering
today, because they indicate agenda for future theoretical and empir-
ical research.
We have chosen to direct our attention to three important prob-
lems raised by those who question the desirability and possibility of
future growth: (a) How good are measures of output currently used for
evaluating the growth of economic welfare? (b) Does the growth proc-
ess inevitably waste our natural resources? (c) How does the rate of
population growth affect economic welfare? In particular, what would
be the effect of zero population growth?
MEASURESOFECONOMIC WELFARE
A major question raised by critics of economic growth is whether we
have been growing at all in any meaningful sense. Gross national prod-
uct statistics cannot give the answers, for GNP is not a measure of
economic welfare. Erlich is right in claiming that maximization of GN P
is not a proper objective of policy. Economists all know that, and yet
their everyday use of GNP as the standard measure of economic per-
formance apparently conveys the impression that they are evangelistic
workshipers of GNP.
An obvious shortcoming of GNP is that it is an index of produc-
tiOn, not consumption. The goal of economic activity, after all, is con-
sumption. Although this is the central premise of economics, the pro-
fession has been slow to develop, either conceptually or statistically,
a measure of economic performance oriented to consumption, broadly
defined and carefully calculated. We have constructed a primitive and
experimental "measure of economic welfare" (MEW), in which we at-
tempt to allow for the more obvious discrepancies between GNP and
economic welfare. A complete account is given in Appendix A. The
main results will be discussed here and summarized in Tables 1 and 2.Is Growth Obsolete? 513
Inproposing a welfare measure, we in no way deny the importance
of the conventional national income accounts or of the output meas-
ures based upon them. Our MEW is largely a rearrangement of items
of the national accounts. Gross and net national product statistics are
the economists' chief tools for short-run analysis, forecasting, and pol-
icy and are also indispensable for many other purposes.
Our adjustments to GNP fall into three general categories: re-
classification of GNP expenditures as consumption, investment, and
intermediate; imputation for the services of consumer capital, for lei-
sure, and for the product of household work; correction for some of
the disamenities of urbanization.
1. Reclassification of GNPFinalExpenditures
Our purposes are first, to subtract some items that are better re-
garded as instrumental and intermediate than as final output, and second,
to allocate all remaining items between consumption and net invest-
ment. Since the national accounts do not differentiate among govern-
ment purchases of goods and services, one of our major tasks will be
to split them among the three categories: intermediate, consumption,
and net investment. We will also reclassify some private expenditures.
Intermediate products are goods and services whose contributions
to present or future consumer welfare are completely counted in the
values of other goods and services. To avoid double counting they
should not be included in reckoning the net yield of economic activity.
Thus all national income accounts reckon as final consumption the
bread but not the flour and as capital formation the finished house but
not the lumber. The more difficult and controversial issues in assigning
items to intermediate or final categories are the following:
Capital Consumption.The depreciation of capital stocks is a
cost of production, and output required to offset the depreciation is in-
termediate as surely as materials consumed in the productive process.
For most purposes, including welfare indexes, NNP is preferable to
GNP. Only the difficulties and lags in estimating capital consumption
have made GNP the popular statistic.
However, NNP itself fails to treat many durable goods as capital,
and counts as final their entire output whether for replacement or ac-
cumulation. These elementary points are worth repeating because some
of our colleagues are telling the public that economists glorify wasteful
"through-put" for its own sake. Focusing on NNP, and accounting for514Amenities and Disamenities of Economic Growth
all durables as capital goods, would avoid such foolish paradoxes as
the implication that deliberate efforts to make goods more perishable
raise national output. We estimate, however, that proper treatment of
consumer durables has little quantitative effect (see Table 1, lines 3
and 5).
Theother capital consumption adjustments we have made arise
from allowing for government capital and for the educational and med-
ical capital embodied in human beings. In effect, we have reclassified
education and health expenditures, both public and private, as capital
investments.
Growth Requirements.In principle net national product tells
how much consumption the economy could indefinitely sustain. GNP
does not tell that; consuming the whole GNP in any year would im-
pair future consumption prospects. But percapita ratherthan aggre-
gate consumption is the welfare objective; neither economists nor other
observers would as a rule regard sheer increase in the numbers of peo-
ple enjoying the same average standard of living as a gain in welfare.
Even NNP exaggerates sustainable per capita consumption, except
in a society with stationary population —anotherexample of the per-
vasiveness of the "stationary" assumption in the past. Per capita con-
sumption cannot be sustained with zero net investment; the capital
stock must be growing at the same rate as population and the labor
force. This capital-widening requirement is as truly a cost of staying
in the same position as outright capital consumption.2
This principle is clear enough when growth is simply increase in
population and the labor force. Its application to an economy with tech-
nological progress is by no means clear. Indeed, the very concept of
national income becomes fuzzy. Should the capital-widening require-
ment then be interpreted to mean that capital should keep pace with
output and technology, not just with the labor force? If so, the implied
sustainable consumption per capita grows with the rate of technological
progress. This is the point of view which we have taken in what follows.
On the other hand, a given level of consumption per capita could be
'the neoclassical model without technological change. When labor force
is growing at rate g, the capital-labor ratio is k,grossproduct per worker isf(k),net
product per worker is f(k)— 6k.then the net investment requirement is gk,andsustain-
able consumption per worker is f(k) —8k—gk.Denoting the capital-output ratio as
=[k/f(k)], sustainableconsumption per worker can also be written asf(k)[ I —+ g)].
AlthoughNNP embodies in principle the depreciation deduction 8k, it does not take ac-
count of the capital-widening requirement gk.Is Growth Obsolete? 515
sustained with a steady decline in the capital-output ratio, thanks to
technological progress.3
The growth requirement is shown on line 7 of Table 2. This is
clearly a significant correction, measuring about 16 per cent of GNP
in 1965.
Our calculations distinguish between actual and sustainable per
capita consumption. Actual MEW may exceed or fall short of sustain-
able MEW, the amount that could be consumed while meeting both
capital consumption and growth requirements. If these requirements
are met, per capita consumption can grow at the trend rate of increase
in labor productivity. When actual MEW is less than sustainable MEW,
the economy is making even better provision for future consumers;
when actual MEW exceeds sustainable MEW, current consumption
in effect includes some of the fruits of future progress.
Instrumental Expenditures.Since GNP and NNP are meas-
ures of production rather than of welfare, they count many activities
that are evidently not directly sources of utility themselves but are re-
grettably necessary inputs to activities that may yield utility. Some con-
sumer outlays are only instrumental, for example, the costs of com-
muting to work. Some government "purchases" are also of this na-
ture —for example, police services, sanitation services, road mainte-
nance, national defense. Expenditures on these items are among the
necessary overhead costs of a complex industrial nation-state, a!-
though there is plenty of room for disagreement as to the necessary
amounts. We are making no judgments on such issues in classifying
these outlays as intermediate rather than final uses of resources. Never-
theless, these decisions are difficult and controversial. The issues are
clearly illustrated in the important case of national defense.
We exclude defense expenditures for two reasons. First, we see no
direct effect of defense expenditures on household economic welfare.
No reasonable country (or household) buys "national defense" for its
own sake. If there were no war or risk of war, there would be no need
As is well known, the whole concept of equilibrium growth collapses unless prog-
ress is purely labor-augmenting, "Harrod-neutral." In that case the rate g above is n+y,
where nisthe natural rate of increase and y is the rate of technological progress, and
"labor force" means effective or augmented labor force. In equilibrium, output and con-
sumption per natural worker grow at the rate y, and "sustainable" consumption per
capita means consumption growing steadily at this rate. Clearly, level consumption per
capita can be sustained with smaller net investment than soand ksteadily
decline. See section A.2.3, below.516Amenities and Disamenities of Economic Growth
for defense expenditures and no one would be the worse without them.
Conceptually, then, defense expenditures are gross but not net output.
The second reason is that defense expenditures are input rather
than output data. Measurable output is especially elusive in the case
of defense. Conceptually, the output of the defense effort is national
security. Has the value of the nation's security risen from $0.5 billion
to $50 billion over the period from 1929 to 1965? Obviously not, It is
patently more reasonable to assume that the rise in expenditure was
due to deterioration in international relations and to changes in military
technology. The cost of providing a given level of security has risen
enormously. If there has been no corresponding gain in security since
1929, the defense cost series is a very misleading indicator of improve-
ments in welfare.
The economy's ability to meet increased defense costs speaks well
for its productive performance. But the diversion of productive capac-
ity to this purpose cannot be regarded simply as a shift of national pref-
erences and the product mix. Just as we count technological progress,
managerial innovation, and environmental change when they work in
our favor (consider new business machines or mineral discoveries) so
we must count a deterioration in the environment when it works against
us (consider bad weather and war). From the point of view of economic
welfare, an arms control or disarmament agreement which would free
resources and raise consumption by 10 per cent would be just as sig-
nificant as new industrial processes yielding the same gains.
In classifying defense costs—or police protection or public health
expenditures—as regrettable and instrumental, we certainly do not
deny the possibility that given the unfavorable circumstances that
prompt these expenditures consumers will ultimately be better off with
them than without them. This may or may not be the case. The only
judgment we make is that these expenditures yield no direct satisfac-
tions. Even if the "regrettable" outlays are rational responses to un-
favorable shifts in the environment of economic activity, we believe
that a welfare measure, perhaps unlike a production measure, should
record such environmental change.
We must admit, however, that the line between final and instru-
mental outlays is very hard to draw. For example, the philosophical
problems raised by the malleability of consumer wants are too deep to
be resolved in economic accounting. Consumers are susceptible to in-
fluence by the examples and tastes of other consumers and by the sales
efforts of producers. Maybe all our wants are just regrettable neces-Is Growth Obsolete? 517
sities;maybe productive activity does no better than to satisfy the
wants which it generates; maybe our net welfare product is tautolog-
ically zero. More seriously, we cannot measure welfare exclusively
by the quantitative flows of goods and services. We need other gauges
of the health of individuals and societies. These, too, will be relative
to the value systems which determine whether given symptoms indi-
cate health or disease. But the "social indicators" movement of recent
years still lacks a coherent, integrative conceptual and statistical frame-
work.
We estimate that overhead and regrettable expenses, so far as we
have been able to define and measure them, rose from 8 per cent to 16
per cent of GNP over the period 1929—65 (Table 2, line 4).
2. Imputations for Capital Services, Leisure, and Nonmarket Work
In the national income accounts, rent is imputed on owner-oc-
cupied homes and counted as consumption and income. We must make
similar imputations in other cases to which we have applied capital ac-
counting. Like owner-occupied homes, other consumer durables and
public investments yield consumption directly, without market transac-
tions. In the case of educational and health capital, we have assumed
the yields to be intermediate services rather than direct consumption;
that is, we expect to see the fruits of investments in education and
health realized in labor productivity and earnings, and we do not count
them twice. Our measure understates economic welfare and its growth
to the extent that education and medical care are direct rather than in-
direct sources of consumer satisfaction.
The omission of leisure and of nonmarket productive activity from
measures of production conveys the impression that economists are
blindly materialistic. Economic theory teaches that welfare could rise,
even while NNP falls, as the result of voluntary choices to work for
pay fewer hours per week, weeks per year, years per lifetime.
These imputations unfortunately raise serious conceptual ques-
tions, discussed at some length in section A.3, below. Suppose that in
calculating aggregate dollar consumption the hours devoted to leisure
and nonmarket productive activity are valued at their presumed op-
portunity cost, the money wage rate. in converting current dollar con-
sumption to constant dollars, what assumption should be made about
the unobservable price indexes for the goods and services consumed
during those hours? The wage rate? The price index for marketed con-
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TABLE 1
Measures of Economic Welfare, Actual and
Sustainable, Various Years, 1929—65




product accounts 139.6125.5183.0206.3255.7290.1 397.7
2Private instrumental ex-
penditures —10.3—9.2—9.2—10.9—16.4—19.9—30.9














8Disamenity correction —12.5—14.1—18.1—19.1—24.3 —27.6—34.6
9Government consump-
tiOn 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.2
10Services of government











14 Population (no. of mill.)121.8127.3140.5144.7163.0174.9 194.6
(continued)
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Table1 (concluded)
19291935 194519471954 1958 1965




C 3,0563,5304,6264,7145,536 5,919 6,832
16Index(1929= 100)
B 100.0108.0121.4123.2129.1 131.4 141.8
A 100.0104.3111.3112.7112.8 112.4 117.8








B 100.0100.9114.3133.0132.2 134.3 142.9




1929= 100 100.078.0155.4131.9149.2 151.1 187.5
Note: Variants A, B, C in the table correspond to different assumptions about the
bearing of technological progress on leisure and nonmarket activities. See section A.3.2,
below, for explanation.
Source:AppendixTable A. 16.
sumption goods? Over a period of forty years the two diverge sub-
stantially; the choice between them makes a big difference in estimates
of the growth of MEW. As explained in Appendix A, the market con-
sumption "deflator" should be used if technological progress has aug-
mented nonmarketed uses of time to the same degree as marketed labor.
The wage rate should be the deflator if no such progress has occurred
in the effectiveness of unpaid time.
In Tables 1 and 2 we provide calculations for three conceptual
alternatives. Our own choice is variant B of MEW, in which the value
of leisure is deflated by the wage rate; and the value of nonmarket ac-
tivity, by the consumption deflator.
'I
.—.-—---- ...-..520Amenitiesand Disamenities of Economic Growth
TABLE 2
Gross National Product and MEW, Various Years, 1929—65
(billions of dollars, 1958 prices)
192919351945194719541958 1965
1. Gross national product 203.6169.5355.2309.9407.0447.3617.8
2. Capital consumption,
NIPA —20.0—20.0 —21.9—18.3—32.5 —38.9—54.7
3. Net national product,
NIPA 183.6149.5333.3291.6374.5408.4563.1
4. NIPA final output reclas-
sifiedasregrettables
and intermediates
a. Government —6.7—7.4 —146.3—20.8—57.8—56.4—63.2
b. Private —10.3—9.2—9.2—10.9—16.4—19.9—30.9
5. Imputations for items not
included in NIPA
a. Leisure 339.5401.3450.7466.9523.2554.9626.9
b. Nonmarket activity 85.7109.2152.4159.6211.5239.7295.4
c. Disamenities —12.5—14.1—18.1—19.1—24.3—27.6—34.6
d. Services of public and
private capital 29.724.231.036.748.9 54.8 78.9
6. Additional capital con-
sumption —19.3—33.4 —11.7—50.8—35.2 —27.3—92.7
7. Growth requirement —46.1—46.7 —65.8+5.4—63.1—78.9—101.8
8. Sustainable MEW 543.6573.4716.3858.6961.31,047.71,241.1
NIPA =nationalincome and product accounts.
Note: Variants A, B, C in the table correspond to different assumptions about the
bearing of technological progress on leisure and nonmarket activities. Variant A as-
sumes that neither has benefited from technological progress at the rate of increase of
real wages; variant C assumes that both have so benefited; variant B assumes that
leisure has not been augmented by technological progress but other nonmarket activities
have benefited. See section A.3.2, below, for explanation.
Source:AppendixTable A.17.
3. Disamenities of Urbanization
The national income accounts largely ignore the many sources of
utility or disutility that are not associated with market transactions or
measured by the market value of goods and services. If one of my
neighbors cultivates a garden of ever-increasing beauty, and another
makes more and more noise, neither my increasing appreciation of the
one nor my growing annoyance with the other comes to the attention
of the Department of Commerce.
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Likewisethere are some socially productive assets (for example,
the environment) that do not appear in any balance sheets. Their ser-
vices to producers and consumers are not valued in calculating national
income. By the same token no allowance is made for depletion of their
capacity to yield services in the future.
Many of the negative "externalities" of economic growth are con-
nected with urbanization and congestion. The secular advances re-
corded in NNP figures have accompanied a vast migration from rural
agriculture to urban industry. Without this occupational and residential
revolution we could not have enjoyed the fruits of technological prog-
ress. But some portion of the higher earnings of urban residents may
simply be compensation for the disamenities of urban life and work. If
so we should not count as a gain of welfare the full increments of NNP
that result from moving a man from farm or small town to city. The
persistent association of higher wages with higher population densities
offers one method of estimating the costs of urban life as they are val-
ued by people making residential and occupational decisions.
As explained in section A.4, below, we have tried to estimate by
cross-sectional regressions the income differentials necessary to hold
people in localities with greater population densities. The resulting
estimates of the disamenity costs of urbanization are shown in Table 1,
line 8. As can be seen, the estimated disamenity premium is quite sub-
stantial, running about 5 per cent of GNP. Nevertheless, the urbaniza-
tion of the population has not been so rapid that charging it with this
cost significantly reduces the estimated rate of growth of the economy.
The adjustments leading from national accounts "personal con-
sumption" to MEW consumption are shown in Table 1, and the rela-
tions of GNP, NNP, and MEW are summarized in Table 2. For rea-
sons previously indicated, we believe that a welfare measure should
have the dimension per capit a. We would stress the per capita MEW
figures shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Although the numbers presented here are very tentative, they do
suggest the following observations. First, MEW is quite different from
conventional output measures. Some consumption items omitted from
GNP are of substantial quantitative importance. Second, our preferred
variant of per capita MEW has been growing more slowly than per
capita NNP (1.1 per cent for MEW as against 1.7 per cent for NNP,
at annual rates over the period 1929—65). Yet MEW has been growing.
The progress indicated by conventional national accounts is not just
a myth that evaporates when a welfare-oriented measure is substituted.522Amenitiesand Disamenities of Economic Growth
GROWTH AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Calculations like the foregoing are unlikely to satisfy critics who be-
lieve that economic growth per se piles up immense social costs ignored
in even the most careful national income calculations. Faced with the
finiteness of our earth and the exponential growth of economy and pop-
ulation, the environmentalist sees inevitable starvation. The specter
of Maithus is haunting even the affluent society.
There is a familiar ring to these criticisms. Ever since the indus-
trial revolution pessimistic scientists and economists have warned that
the possibilities of economic expansion are ultimately limited by the
availability of natural resources and that society only makes the even-
tual future reckoning more painful by ignoring resource limitations
now.
In important part, this is a warning about population growth, which
we consider below. Taking population developments as given, will nat-
ural resources become an increasingly severe drag on economic growth?
We have not found evidence to support this fear. Indeed, the opposite
appears to be more likely: Growth of output per capita will accelerate
ever so slightly even as stocks of natural resources decline.
The prevailing standard model of growth assumes that there are
no limits on the feasibility of expanding the supplies of nonhuman
agents of production. It is basically a two-factor model in which pro-
duction depends only on labor and reproducible capital. Land and re-
sources, the third member of the classical triad, have generally been
dropped. The simplifications of theory carry over into empirical work.
The thousands of aggregate production functions estimated by econo-
metricians in the last decade are labor-capital functions. Presumably
the tacit justification has been that reproducible capital is a near-perfect
substitute for land and other exhaustible resources, at least in the per-
spective of heroic aggregation customary in macroeconomics. If sub-
stitution for natural resources is not possible in any given technology,
or if a particular resource is exhausted, we tacitly assume that "land-
augmenting" innovations will overcome the scarcity.
These optimistic assumptions about technology stand in contrast
to the tacit assumption of environmentalists that no substitutes are
available for natural resources. Under this condition, it is easily seen
that output will indeed stop growing or will decline. It thus appears that
the substitutability (or technically, the elasticity of substitution) be-
tween the neoclassical factors, capital and labor, and natural resources
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is of crucial importance to future growth. This is an area needing ex-
tensive further research, but we have made two forays to see what the
evidence is. Details are given in Appendix B, below.
First we ran several simulations of the process of economic growth
in order to see which assumptions about substitution and technology
fit the "stylized" facts. The important facts are: growing income per
capita and growing capital per capita; relatively declining inputs and
income shares of natural resources; and a slowly declining capital-out-
put ratio. Among the various forms of production function considered,
the following assumptions come closest to reproducing these stylized
facts: (a) Either the elasticity of substitution between natural resources
and other factors is high —significantlygreater than unity —orresource-
augmenting technological change has proceeded faster than overall
productivity; (b) the elasticity of substitution between labor and cap-
ital is close to unity.
After these simulations were run, it appeared possible to estimate
directly the parameters of the preferred form of production function.
Econometric estimates confirm proposition (a) and seem to support the
alternative of high elasticity of substitution between resources and the
neoclassical factors.
Of course it is always possible that the future will be discontin-
uously different from the past. But ii our estimates are accepted, then
continuation of substitution during the next fifty years, during which
many environmentalists foresee the end to growth, will result in a small
increase —perhapsabout 0.1 per cent per annum —inthe growth of per
capita income.
Is our economy, with its mixture of market processes and govern-
mental controls, biased in favor of wasteful and shortsighted exploita-
tion of natural resources? In considering this charge, two archetypical
cases must be distinguished, although many actual cases fall between
• them. First, there are appropnable resources for which buyers pay
market values and users market rentals. Second, there are inappro-
priable resources, "public goods," whose use appears free to individual
producers and consumers but is costly in aggregate to society.
• If the past is any guide for the future, there seems to be little rea-
son to worry about the exhaustion of resources which the market al-
ready treats as economic goods. We have already commented on the
irony that both growth men and antigrowth men invoke the interests
of future generations. The issue between them is not whether and how
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it should be made. The growth man emphasizes reproducible capital
and education. The conservationist emphasizes exhaustible resources
—mineralsin the ground, open space, virgin land. The economist's
initial presumption is that the market will decide in what forms to
transmit wealth by the requirement that all kinds of wealth bear a com-
parable rate of return. Now stocks of natural resources —for example,
mineral deposits—are essentially sterile. Their return to their owners
is the increase in their prices relative to prices of other goods. In a
properly functioning market economy, resources will be exploited at
such a pace that their rate of relative price appreciation is competitive
with rates of return on other kinds of capital. Many conservationists
have noted such price appreciation with horror, but if the prices of
these resources accurately reflect the scarcities of the future, they must
rise in order to prevent too rapid exploitation. Natural resources should
grow in relative scarcity—otherwise they are an inefficient way for so-
ciety to hold and transmit wealth compared to productive physical and
human capital. Price appreciation protects resources from premature
exploitation.
How would an excessive rate of exploitation show up? We would
see rates of relative price increase that are above the general real rate
of return on wealth. This would indicate that society had in the past
used precious resources too profligately, relative to the tastes and tech-
nologies later revealed. The scattered evidence we have indicates little
excessive price rise. For some resources, indeed, prices seem to have
risen more slowly than efficient use would indicate ex post.
If this reasoning is correct, the nightmare of a day of reckoning
and economic collapse when, for example, all fossil fuels are forever
gone seems to be based on failure to recognize the existing and future
possibilities of substitute materials and processes. As the day of reck-
oning approaches, fuel prices will provide —asthey do not now —strong
incentives for such substitutions, as well as for the conservation of
remaining supplies. On the other hand, the warnings of the conserva-
tionists and scientists do underscore the importance of continuous
monitoring of the national and world outlook for energy and other re-
sources. Substitutability might disappear. Conceivably both the market
and public agencies might be too complacent about the prospects for
new and safe substitutes for fossil fuels. The opportunity and need for
fruitful collaboration between economists and physical scientists has
never been greater.
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problem. It is useful to distinguish between local and global ecological
disturbances. The former include transient air pollution, water pol-
lution, noise pollution, visual disamenities. It is certainly true that we
have not charged automobile users and electricity consumers for their
pollution of the skies, or farmers and housewives for the pollution of
lakes by the runoff of fertilizers and detergents. In that degree our na-
tional product series have overestimated the advance of welfare. Our
urban disamenity estimates given above indicate a current overesti-
mate of about 5 per cent of total consumption.
There are other serious consequences of treating as free things
which are not really free. This practice gives the wrong signals for the
directions of economic growth. The producers of automobiles and of
electricity should be given incentives to develop and to utilize "cleaner"
technologies. The consumers of automobiles and electricity should pay
in higher prices for the pollution they cause, or for the higher costs of
low-pollution processes. If recognition of these costs causes consumers
to shift their purchases to other goods and services, that is only effi-
cient. At present overproduction of these goods is uneconomically sub-
sidized as truly as if the producers received cash subsidies from the
Treasury.
The mistake of the antigrowth men is to blame economic growth
per se for the misdirection of economic growth. The misdirection is
due to a defect of the pricing system— a serious but by no means irrep-
arable defect and one which would in any case be present in a station-
ary economy. Pollutants have multiplied much faster than the popula-
tion or the economy during the last thirty years. Although general
economic growth has intensified the problem, it seems to originate in
particular technologies. The proper remedy is to correct the price sys-
tern so as to discourage these technologies. Zero economic growth is
a blunt instrument for cleaner air, prodigiously expensive and probably
ineffectual.
As for the danger of global ecological catastrophes, there is prob-
ably very little that economics alone can say. Maybe we are pouring
pollutants into the atmosphere at such a rate that we will melt the polar
icecaps and flood all the world's seaports. Unfortunately, there seems
to be great uncertainty about the causes and the likelihood of such oc-
currences. These catastrophic global disturbances warrant a higher
priority for research than the local disturbances to which so much at-
tention has been given.
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POPULATION GROWTH
Like the role of natural resources, the role of population in the standard
neoclassical model is ripe for re-examination. The assumption is that
population and labor force grow exogenously, like compound interest.
Objections arise on both descriptive and normative grounds. We know
that population growth cannot continue forever. Some day there will
be stable or declining population, either with high birth and death rates
and short life expectancies, or with low birth and death rates and long
life expectancies. As Richard Easterlin argues in his National Bureau
book,4 there surely is some adaptation of human fertility and mortality
to economic circumstances. Alas, neither economists nor other social
scientists have been notably successful in developing a theory of fer-
tility that corresponds even roughly to the facts. The subject deserves
much more attention from economists and econometricians than it has
received.
On the normative side, the complaint is that economists should
not fatalistically acquiesce in whatever population growth happens.
They should instead help to frame a population policy. Since the costs
to society of additional children may exceed the costs to the parents,
childbearing decisions are a signal example of market failure. How to
internalize the full social costs of reproduction is an even more chal-
lenging problem than internalizing the social costs of pollution.
During the past ten years, the fertility of the United States pop-
ulation has declined dramatically. If continued, this trend would soon
diminish fertility to a level ultimately consistent with zero population
growth. But such trends have been reversed in the past, and in the ab-
sence of any real understanding of the determinants of fertility, pre-
dictions are extremely hazardous.
The decline may be illustrated by comparing the 1960 and 1967
net reproduction rates and intrinsic (economists would say "equilib-
rium") rates of growth of the United States population. The calcula-
tions of Table 3 refer to the asymptotic steady-state implications of
indefinite continuation of the age-specific fertility and mortality rates
of the year 1960 or 1967. Should the trend of the 1960s continue, the
intrinsic growth rate would become zero, and the net reproduction rate
1.000, in the 1 970s. Supposing that the decline in fertility then stopped.
The actual population would grow slowly for another forty or fifty
4Popularion, Labor Force, and Long Swings in Economic Growth: The American









mortality 2.1362 1.750 21—22
1967 fertility-
mortality 0.7370 1.221 28
Hypothetical ZPG 0.0000 1.000 32
years while the inherited bulge in the age distribution at the more fer-
tile years gradually disappeared. The asymptotic size of the population
would be between 250 million and 300 million.
One consequence of slowing down the rate of population growth
by diminished fertility is, of course, a substantial increase in the age of
the equilibrium population, as indicated in the third column of Table 3.
It is hard to judge to what degree qualitative change and innovation
have in the past been dependent on quantitative growth. When our in-
stitutions are expanding in size and in number, deadwood can be grace-
fully bypassed and the young can guide the new. In a stationary pop-
ulation, institutional change will either be slower or more painful.
The current trend in fertility in the United States suggests that,
contrary to the pessimistic warnings of some of the more extreme anti-
growth men, it seems quite possible that ZPG can be reached while
childbearing remains a voluntary private decision. Government policy
can concentrate on making it completely voluntary by extending the
availability of birth control knowledge and technique and of legal abor-
tion. Since some 20 per cent of current births are estimated to be un-
intended, it may well be that intended births at present are insufficient
to sustain the population.
Once the rate of population growth is regarded as a variable, per-
haps one subject to conscious social control, the neoclassical growth
model can tell some of the consequences of its variation. As explained
above, sustainable per capita consumption (growing at the rate of tech-
nological progress) requires enough net investment to increase the cap-
ital stock at the natural rate of growth of the economy (the sum of the
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TABLE 3
U.S. Population Characteristics in Equilibrium
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rate of increase of population and productivity). Given the capital-out-
put ratio, sustainable consumption per capita will be larger the lower
the rate of population increase; at the same time, the capital-widening
requirement is diminished.
This is, however, not the only effect of a reduction of the rate of
population growth. The equilibrium capital-output ratio itself is altered.
The average wealth of a population is a weighted average of the wealth
positions of people of different ages. Over its life cycle the typical fam-
ily, starting from low or negative net worth, accumulates wealth to
spend in old age, and perhaps in middle years when children are most
costly. Now a stationary or slow-growing population has a character-
istic age distribution much different from that of a rapidly growing pop-
ulation. The stationary population will have relatively fewer people in
the early low-wealth years, but relatively more in the late low-wealth
TABLE 4
Illustrative Relationship of Sustainable Per Capita Consumption to
Marginal Productivity of Capital and to Capital-Output Ratio
Marginal Produc-
tivity of Capital





Depre-Capital CapitalNNP per Pop. Pop.
Grossciationto GNPto NNPCapitaGrowthGrowth ZPG
(R) (R—8) (gil) (jz) (y)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
.09 .05 3.703 4.346 1.639 1.265 1.372 1.426
.105 .065 3.175 3.637 1.556 1.265 1.344 1.386
.12 .08 2.778 3.125 1.482 1.245 1.309 1.343
.15 .11 2.222 2.439 1.356 1.187 1.233 1.257
Note: ACobb-Douglas production function is assumed for GNP, with constant re-
turns to scale, with an elasticity of output with respect to capital (a)ofY3, and with the
rate (y) of labor-augmenting technological progress 3 per cent per year. The deprecia-
tion rate (6) is assumed to be 4 per cent per year. GN P per capita (Y) is ae"k' and NN P
per capita (y) is Y —6k,where k is the capital-labor ratio.
Column 3: Since Rk =aY,=k/Y=aIR.
Column 4:= —
Column5: y =(I— For the index, is set equal to I.
Columns 6, 7, and 8: c=[l Given y=O.03, n+y is 0.0513 for
1960, 0.0374 for 1967, 0.0300 for ZPG.
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TABLE 5
Desired Wealth-Income Ratios Estimated
for Different Rates of Population Growth
(and for Different Equivalent Adult Scales




Desired Wealth-income Ratio (j.t)
1960 Pop. 1967 Pop.
(R —8) Growth (.02 1)Growth (.007) ZPG
.05
Teenagers, 1.0; Children,1.0;DIscount, 0.02
—1.70 —1.46 —1.24
.065 0.59 0.91 1.16
.08 2.31 2.70 2.90
.11 4.31 4.71 4,95
.05
Teenagers, 0.8; Children, 0.6; DIscount, 0.01
0.41 0.74 0.97
.065 2.36 2.75 3.00
.08 3.74 4.16 4.41
.11 5.17 5.55 5.75
Teenagers, 0.8; Children, 0.6; Discount,0.02
.05 —1.17 —0.95 —0.75
.065 1.08 1.38 1.60
.08 2.74 3.11 3.34
.11 4.61 4.98 5.18
.05
Teenagers, 0.0; Children, 0.0; Discount, 0.02
—0.40 —0.15 0.02
.065 1.93 2.20 2.36
.08 3.56 3.85 4.01
.11 5.20 5.47 5.61
Note: The desired wealth-income ratio is calculated for
a given steady state of population increase and the cor-
responding equilibrium age distribution. It is an aggregation
of the wealth and income positions of households of dif-
ferent ages. As explained in Appendix C it also depends on
the interest rate, the typical age-income profile and the ex-
pected growth of incomes (y =0.03),the rate of subjective
discount of future utility of consumption, and the weights
given to teenagers (boys 14—20 and girls 14—18) and other
children in household allocations of lifetime incomes to
consumption in different years. See Appendix C for further
explanation.
aShownin boldface.
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TABLE 6
Estimated Equilibrium Capital-Output Ratios
and Per Capita Consumption Rates a
Per Cent
Population Interest Capital-Output Consumption Increase
Growth Rate Ratio Index in c over
Rate (R —6) (c) 1960
1960
Teenagers, 1.0; Children, 1.0; Discount, 0.02
.089 2.88 1.23
1967 .085 2.99 1.30 5.62
ZPG .082 3.07 1.34 9.04
Teenagers, 0.8; Children,0.6; Discount, 0.01
1960 .074 3.28 1.25
1967 .071 3.38 1.33 6.23
ZPG .069 3.47 1.37 9.74
1960
Teenagers, 0.8; Children, 0.6; Discount, 0.02
.084 3.00 1.24
1967 .080 3.11 1.31 5.82
ZPG . .078 3.16 1.35 8.97
1960
Teenagers, 0.0; Children, 0.0; Discount, 0.02
.077 3.22 1.25
1967 .074 3.28 1.32 6.42
ZPG .073 3.33 1.36 9.99
Note: Estimated by interpolation from Tables 4 and 5. See Figure I.
aEquivalentadult scales and subjective discount rate are shown in boldface.
years. So it is not obvious in which direction the shift of weights moves
the average.
We have, however, estimated the shift by a series of calculations
described in Appendix C. Illustrative results are shown in Tables 4—6
and Figure 1. Evidently, reduction in the rate of growth increases the
society's desired wealth-income ratio. This means an increase in the
capital-output ratio which increases the society's sustainable consump-
tion per capita.5
On both counts, therefore, a reduction in population increase
Provided only that the change is made from an initial situation in which the net
marginal productivity of capital exceeds the economy's natural rate of growth. Other-
wise the increased capital-widening requirements exceed the gains in output.Is Growth Obsolete? 531
FIGURE1
Determination of Equilibrium Capital-Output Ratio and Interest Rate
(equivalentadult scale for teenagers and children = 1.0; subjective
discount rate = 0.02)
Interest ratenet marginal
productivity of capitol =
should raise sustainable consumption. We have essayed an estimate
of the magnitude of this gain. In a ZPG equilibrium sustainable con-
sumption per capita would be 9—10 per cent higher than in a steady
state of 2.1 per cent growth corresponding to 1960 fertility and mor-
tality, and somewhat more than 3 per cent higher than in a steady state
of 0.7 per cent growth corresponding to 1967 fertility and mortality.
These neoclassical calculations do not take account of the lower
pressure of population growth on natural resources. As between the
1960 equilibrium and ZPG, the diminished drag of resource limitations
is worth about one-tenth of 1 per cent per annum in growth of per cap-
Source: Tables4 and 5.
-2 -1 0 I 2 3 4 5
Capital-output ratiowealth-income ratio
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ita consumption. Moreover, if our optimistic estimates of the ease of
substitution of other factors of production for natural resources are
wrong, a slowdown of population growth will have much more impor-
tant effects in postponing the day of reckoning.
Is growth obsolete? We think not. Although GNP and other na-
tional income aggregates are imperfect measures of welfare, the broad
picture of secular progress which they convey remains after correction
of their most obvious deficiencies. At present there is no reason to ar-
rest general economic growth to conserve natural resources, although
there is good reason to provide proper economic incentives to conserve
resources which currently cost their users less than true social cost.
Population growth cannot continue indefinitely, and evidently it is al-
ready slowing down in the United States. This slowdown will signifi-
cantly increase sustainable per capita consumption. But even with ZPG
there is no reason to shut off technological progress. The classical sta-
tionary state need not become our utopian norm.
COMMENT
S. FRED SINGER, University of Virginia
1. In December 1970, I was asked to give my reaction to an earlier
version of the Nordhaus-Tobin paper. I quote from my letter:
It is an outstanding, pioneering paper. It sets out to do something that we
have long wanted to do (see, for example, the express remarks by Preston
Cloud and Garrett Hardin at the AAAS Symposium on Optimum Popula-
tion), namely, to transform the GNP into an index which measures more
directly what would correspond to quality of life. This paper is an admirable
effort in that direction and combines sound and original thinking with a
very fine style of writing. There are six different kinds of corrections that are
made to the GNP, or rather to the NNP (Net National Product). I have to
withhold judgment on how well they have succeeded until I have a chance
to study the appendices in detail. It is clear that what they have done is
much more than just a bookkeeping job, i.e., pushing items from one category
to another. They have incorporated a good deal of judgment, some educated
guesses, and some interesting and original analyses.
Their most striking conclusion is that MEW (Measure of Economic Wel-
1Thesymposium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
that is mentioned in the letter was held in 1969. The papers and discussion are
contained in S. F. Singer, ed., Is ThereanOptimum Level ofPopulation?, New
York, McGraw-Hill, 1971.is Growth Obsolete? 533
fare)has grown faster than the NNP. One word of caution, though; their
corrections to the NNP are not small. In many cases they are larger than
the NNP itself so that their final result is very sensitive to the goodness of
the correction.
An area in which their analysis is weak is the exhaustion of natural re-
sources and the evaluation of the diseconomies of pollution.
Although I would take issue with many points in detail, and perhaps some
other major points, the study is immensely valuable and breaks new ground.
It is of particular value to me because it complements what I am trying to
do and therefore helps me very directly. Even the title of their paper "Is
Growth Obsolete?" resembles mine, which is "When Does Growth Become
Too Expensive?" The factors which they, have not handled or handled well
are precisely the ones that I am covering.
I have now given it one reasonably careful reading; it deserves at least
three more.
2. I have now done my three readings and have no reason to change
my mind. It is indeed an "outstanding, pioneering" paper. However,
I will take issue in detail, in the expectation that constructive criticism
will help us arrive at a better approximation to an index of economic
welfare. If I am a little diffident in putting forth my views on the paper,
itis because of John Meyer's admonition to "let a hundred flowers
bloom." Perhaps he recalls that this pronouncement was made by
Chairman Mao who then promptly chopped off the heads of all those
flowers.
George Jaszi has admonished us not to construct indexes on a whole-
sale basis. One should have a particular purpose in mind, because this
in turn conditions the index. Another important thing to keep in mind
is the time scale of our examination. We are definitely interested in time
scales of ten to twenty years rather than one to two years. This allows
important simplifications for the determination of an index.
My own purpose isto answer a very simple-sounding question,
namely: Would we be better off or worse off in the future if we had
more people or fewer people? 2Thisrequires a rather different kind of
2Thisproblem, however, is not addressed by Nordhaus and Tobin, although
it may appear so on a superficial reading of their Appendix C (the appendixes
may be found in Economic Growth, Fiftieth Anniversary Colloquium V, New
York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972). Instead they address a
second-order effect, namely, how does age distribution of a population (or rate
of growth, which is equivalent)affect welfare. Although they show that zero
population growth rate,i.e.,a specific age distribution corresponding toa net
reproduction ratio of one, gives, a higher index than a growing population, I
would hazard that a negative population growth rate may give an even larger
value to the quality index MEW.ri
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examination than that in the Nordhaus-Tobin paper. In particular, I
believe that the exhaustion of natural resources and the increasing use
of "free" goods, such as air and water, have to be closely examined
because they may play a primary role.
3. In their Appendix B, Nordhaus-Tobin arrive at the surprising con-
clusion that welfare will increase as growth continues in spite of the ex-
haustion of natural resources. Closer analysis shows that they assume
the ready substitution of one resource for another. This of course is
the key problem, and I rather doubt whether this assumption will be
valid. The word ready has to be emphasized; and an appreciable time
lag in substitution will affect growth through price increases. To gain
some perspective on this problem, we should note that currently about
3 to 4 per cent of the GNPisspent on fossil fuels, and that fossil
fuel prices have been rising rather steeply. Increased fuel costs will
reflect themselves in increased costs of all goods and most services.
In particular, the necessit1es of life, including food, will become more
costly and thus affect the welfare of the poorer section of the population
even more strongly. (I purposely choose fossil fuels because they play
such an important role in our economy. Nonrenewable fuel resources
are not easily replaceable, and they certainly cannot be exchanged for
land, as in neoclassical growth analysis. Computer simulations, as in
Appendix B, do nothing to support the correctness of Nordhaus and
Tobin's basic assumptions.)
It can of course be argued that exhaustion of natural resources will
raise the price of manufactured goods, leading to a reduced emphasis
on growth in that direction and more emphasis on services. This is a
current trend, but it cannot continue all the way and is not caused by
resource shortages. On the other hand, costs associated with manu-
factured goods may rise even more steeply, because of the associated
environmental costs. This matter is discussed in more detail below.
4. Most of the Nordhaus-Tobin paper (Appendix A) is of course
given over to the calculation of a new welfare index. There is a great
deal of room for subjective views on both the imputations and amputa-
tions which they perform. I will review my known predilections rather
briefly, but then spend more time on a major omission, i.e., the one
dealing with environmental externalities and social costs.
Before starting on a detailed discussion, I need to explain the differ-
ence between what I call intrinsic and extrinsic items. Intrinsic items
are those directly connected with and traceable to economic growth:
items such as exhaustion of natural resources, pollution control costs,
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disamenities due to crowding, etc. Extrinsic items are not necessarily
related, or at least not strongly related, to economic growth, and in-
clude expenditures for defense, space research, and science generally.
Since relative (rather than absolute) welfare measures are of real im-
portance in relation to governmental policies, i.e., would we be better
off or worse off if we do something and follow a certain path, we can
in many cases neglect or sidestep extrinsic factors and the corrections
which they produce to the GNP.
The big Nordhaus-Tobin corrections are for leisure (on the order
of 200 per cent of market consumption) and for nonmarket activities,
on the order of 100 per cent. On the other hand, their disamenity cor-
rection for urban congestion and all other urban problems is less than
5 per cent, which is surprisingly small; and they have no correction at
all for pollution control. Since leisure and nonmarket activities are so
large, this means that the corrections have to be done with great care:
a small difference can distort the over-all result. Unfortunately, these
corrections are rather arbitrary. With respect to the Nordhaus-Tobin
discussion on leisure, three points could be made, One is that eating
is a necessity; it should not be counted as a leisure-time activity. An-
other is that leisure-time value might be established by observing what
people actually do. After all, working involves not only a benefit, i.e.,
wages, but also disutility. How much of a premium are people willing
to pay, say, to save travel time and have more leisure? And finally, their
key assumption is that leisure time can in fact be traded for working
hours and additional wages. This may not be true; perhaps the economy
cannot accommodate increased working hours without increasing un-
employment. In that case, the basis for using opportunity costs for leisure
disappears.
The urban disamenity correction calculated by Nordhaus and Tobin
on the basis of higher urban incomes is interesting but it may be an
underestimate.2 The reason is that many urban diseconomies are sub-
sidized by nonurban residents, i.e., by the general taxpayer. One would
like to see additional analyses, using as a basis the costs for urban
services or the urban cost-of-living index. It would be interesting to
see if these methods arrive at the same result as Nordhaus-Tobin.4
On the other hand, the increased urban salaries may be closely tied in to the
increased costs and time of commuting to work which they subtracted under
"regrettables." Also, to what extent are urban salaries higher just because there
are more job opportunities in urban areas for people of higher education?
It is necessary to subtract here all costs, direct or indirect, that are based on
the higher value of land in the city. Unlike the real costs of traffic snarls and536 Amenities and Disamenities of Economic Growth
5. The correction for environmental protection is a major one, I
believe. Pollution control costs should rise more rapidly even than
GNP. This nonlinear relationship is easy to explain if we consider that
the natural environment has a limited but finite assimilative capacity.5
Once the effluent level exceeds this capacity, then expenditures must be
provided. In order to maintain a fixed level of environmental quality,
the degree of clean-up has to increase, and unfortunately, the costs
rise steeply with the degree of clean-up. This is the approach that I
have taken in my work: by holding environmental quality fixed I do
not have to consider the benefits or damages of environmental quality
or pollution. Most of the costs are connected with the production or
use of various forms of energy, but through the input-output table,
these costs will reflect themselves also in the costs of intermediate and
consumer goods, principally, aluminum, fertilizers, paper, etc. In the
final analysis, the prices of food and other items that play an important
part in the cost of living index will rise and diminish welfare.
6. In conclusion, it is possible to apply various corrections to the
GNP to arrive at a better measure of welfare, including some imputa-
tions and some amputations. There is one item, however, which de-
serves more careful attention and that is the distribution of welfare.
Intuitively, one would think that a narrow distribution leads to a more
stable society, and therefore contributes greatly to societal welfare. It
would be important to know how to assign a welfare value to changes
in income distribution as well as to changes in the average income.
IMRE BERNOLAK, Canada Department of Industry, Trade,
and Commerce
In my view it is very significant that the major adjustments Nordhaus
and Tobin have made in the national accounts in order to allow for
welfare considerations did not lead them to the conclusion that growth
was obsolete, or that the progress indicated by conventional national
accounts was just a myth. However, I cannot see why they take the de-
fensive attitude about growth which is indicated by their remarks: "at
other impediments to intra-urban transportation, land rents (and the price in-
creases they cause) are transfer payments. For the same reason, urban salaries
are subject to a large correction when used to measure urban disamenities.
As a matter of interest, it should be noted that if people were perfectly dis-
tributed, according to the available surface water, then the United States could
accommodate 250 million people without requiring any sewage treatment.
.4T
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present there is no reason to arrest general economic growth.. .,"
or"even with zero population growth there is no reason to shut off
technological progress." I believe that economic growth and techno-
logical progress are not only possible but also necessary for the better-
ment of human welfare.
The disagreement is probably due to the general confusion about the
meaning of growth, and an attempt to clarify it might serve a useful pur-
pose. Why isit that the same policymakers who are the staunchest
advocates of the protection of the environment and who often criticize
economic growth on the basis that it might be detrimental to our natural
resources and to the quality of life take the strongest measures to stimu-
late expansion as soon as the growth of the gross national product tends
to slow down? What leads to this apparent growth dilemma?
I think the explanation of the problem is historical. It was observed
that over the centuries the might and wealth of nations was associated
with the size of their populations, and even today we see that those na-
tions and industries prosper which find large numbers of customers for
their products and services. These observations have led to the wide-
spread, and erroneous, assumption that growth necessarily means pop-
ulation growth, together with the environmental problems it may cause.
To find the true meaning of economic growth, we must look at what
the economy is all about: people producing goods and services to satisfy
their wants. The wants are individual wants, even if they are satisfied
collectively. As Nordhaus and Tobin themselves emphasized itcor-
rectly,itis "per capita rather than aggregate consumption [that]is
the welfare objective." Progress in welfare is, therefore, growing in per
capita consumption and, in order to provide for this increasing per cap-
ita consumption, economic growth must mean increasing per capita pro-
duction (unless it comes from self-generating free resources).
The latter is determined by the productivity of the labor force en-
gaged in production, and economic growth cannot originate from any
other source than increased over-all labor productivity (whatever the
factors may be that bring about this productivity increase). It is true
that society may choose increased leisure time as a preferred welfare
objective but this is then proportionately traded off against economic
growth in the per capita production (and consumption) of goods and
services. It may also be chosen as a welfare objective to divide at least
part of the national real output among all members of the society rather
than in accordance with the contribution of the individual to total
output, as is in the case of many public services and of the various
Irn
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forms of guaranteed annual income or similar income-sharing plans.
This is only a question of income distribution and all must come out
of the productivity of the employed labor force.
As our real income increases, it is just human nature to want more
and/or a better quality of goods and services. In addition, it takes
only simple arithmetic to show that if we can produce the goods and
services we want at a lower environmental cost or from fewer resources
than before through better technology, it is also economic growth. If we
can produce a nonpolluting car tomorrow instead of today's polluting
car, that is economic as well as welfare growth.
Summing up this point, I see the true chance for economic growth in
the increasing per capita demand for (and production of) goods and
services and in the improving quality of these, rather than in population
growth. And I believe that this per capita growth potential is much
greater than estimated by Nordhaus and Tobin.
The second point I wish to make refers to the contribution of national
accounts to the measurement of welfare growth.
Although gross national product is not a welfare measure, the Nord-
haus-Tobin paper supports the view that, in spite of its shortcomings,
it does correctly indicate the direction of progress. How could it be
otherwise? We cannot have better health without doctors and medicines,
hospitals, and modern equipment; enjoy outdoor life without roads,
transport equipment, skis, boats, proper clothing, or prepared foods;
concerts without musicians or musical instruments (and nowadays
without amplifiers); or arts without artists, metals, or paints; and so on.
All of these aremeasuredin the national accounts. Although GNP
does not measure welfare, many if not most elements of welfare are,
in fact, measured by it.
At this conference numerous suggestions were made toward the de-
velopment of an integrated framework of social indicators which would
be distinct from the national accounts. With these I agree. I also be-
lieve, however, that the national accounts can be improved further, par-
ticularly in the measurement of quality change and in the sectors where
output is now measured by inputs. I think that through detailed studies
of principal characteristics of a carefully selected sample of products
and services, productivity indicators can be developed, through which
progress can be made toward better output measures in these areas.
In the field of quality measurement I think there is scope in cross-
sectional analyses because it is easier to measure the differences between
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atthe same time, than changes over time. Other useful suggestions
about the direction such studies could take have been presented in Jaszi's
note in the August 1962 issue of the Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics, and still apply.
In the field of government output, two approaches toward improve-
ment appear to be particularly feasible. Impact or output measures,
which are usually very complex, can be subdivided into measurable
elements. For instance, instead of "industrial development" we can
strive toward measuring the elements of this over-all objective, such as
progress in productivity, profitability, wage. level, employment, distri-
bution of employment, industrial structure and concentration, the ratio
of technically trained labor force, etc. At the performance level, specific
productivity indexes can be developed, which can be applied through
careful analysis, to adjust governmental output. In the United States,
John Kendrick has clearly illustrated the feasibility of such measures,
while in Canada some successful experiments have been made in this
direction by the National Output and Productivity Division of Statistics
Canada (formerly Dominion Bureau of Statistics). Since productivity
does not just happen but is brought about by various factors, and since
these factors, including better management, better education, better
methods and equipment, are more or less keeping pace in the public
service with the private sector, it just does not make sense to keep the
productivity measure constant in the public sector. Furthermore, ignor-
ing productivity changes in the public sector leads to noncomparability
of national accounts on an international basis.
With the growing importance of quality in the production of both
goods and services, and with the rapid growth of the public sector, I
believe that improvements in these areas are much more promising
avenues toward a better measurement of economic, or even welfare,
progress then imaginative (but for the time being unworkable) attempts
at turning the national accounts into social welfare measures. I think
that a number of points raised by George Jaszi in his comments on the
Juster paper apply equally to the Nordhaus-Tobin study too.
In conclusion, I would like to make two brief observations concerning
the Nordhaus-Tobin paper. First, I do not understand why the authors
exclude defense services from national output (or more precisely, from
their measure of economic welfare) when these can hardly be considered
as anything else but freedom as output, measured by the relevant inputs.
Freedom is, as the authors pointed out, one of the basic welfare goals
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authors when they consider health services as intermediate output and
exclude them from national output. I realize that good health contri-
butes to one's productivity but I cannot help taking medical services
as final output because when I buy them I do so, and I believe that
there are others who share my views, because I simply enjoy living and
being healthy.
DAN USHER, Queen's University
The effect of Nordhaus and Tobin's imputation for leisure is to
reduce the rate of economic growth despite the fact that consumption of
leisure is increasing over time. I would like to contrast their imputa-
tion with an alternative according to which more leisure implies more
growth, not less.
There are three variants of Nordhaus and Tobin's imputation for
leisure and nonmarket activity. Variant A is based on the assumption
that there is no change over time in labor productivity of leisure and
nonmarket activity. Variant B is based on the assumption that there
is no change over time in labor productivity of leisure but that produc-
tivity of labor in nonmarket activity increases along with and to the
same extent as labor productivity in creating ordinary goods and serv-
ices. Variant C is based on the assumption that the growth over time
in the productivity of labor is the same for leisure, nonmarket activity,
and ordinary goods and services. In this comment I shall consider only
variant A, but the points I raise are relevant with modification to vari-
ants B and C as well.
Nordhaus and Tobin impute for leisure by treating leisure over and
above an assumed minimum of seven hours a day as an extra com-
modity which they evaluate at the wage in the base year. Suppose that
output is produced with labor alone, that the wage rate is $9 per hour
in 1961 and $36 per hour in 1971, that the consumer price index
is the same in 1961 and 1971, and that people work an eight-hour day
in 1961 and a six-hour day in 1971. Income as conventionally meas-
ured grows by a factor of 3.0 from $72 per day to $216 per day. Leis-
ure increases from 9 hours per day (24 —8—7)to 11 hours per day
(24 —6—7),its value at 1961 prices and wages is $81 in 1961 and
$99 in 1971, income inclusive of the imputation for leisure is $153 in
1961 and $315 in 1971, and income inclusive of the imputation grows
by a factor of 2.1. Notice that the ratio of incomes in 1961 and 1971
and the implied growth rate between these dates are reduced by theIs Growth Obsolete? 541
imputationdespite the fact that the number of hours of leisure has
increased.
An alternative method of imputation would treat the reduction in hours
as an extra bit of growth. To the conventional measure of income is
added or subtracted each year a sum of money sufficient to compensate
the representative consumer for the difference in hours worked between
that year and the base year. The rationale of the alternative method is
based on an analogy between real incomes in different years and the
spectrum of money incomes in some given base year. If in 1961, Mr. A
earns $72 per day and Mr. B earns $216 per day, we would say the
Mr. B has 3 times the income of Mr. A. We might even be prepared to )
saythat the ratio of their incomes is larger than 3 if Mr. B works less
than Mr. A, but we would certainly not say that it is only 2.1 because
both parties enjoy a substantial amount of leisure. We make a distinction
among good things between those like cars, food, and clothing that we
treat as part of income and those like leisure, friendship, or the love of
God that we exclude from income. Normally when we speak of growth,
we consider only the growth of what we choose to call income and we
suppose that good things not included in income remain invariant, thus
preserving the analogy between real incomes over time and the spectrum
of income at a moment of time. The alternative imputation adjusts in-
comes to what they would have to be if existing levels of utility were
preserved and if the ceterus paribus assumptions were true.
Formally, we may impute for changes in amounts of leisure in the
same way that I have imputed for changes in life expectancy in my
essay in this volume. The representative consumer is assumed to have a
utility function U[C(t), L(t)], where C(t) is the value in the year tof
real income as conventionally measured, and L(t) is the amount of
leisure in the year t.DefineC(t), real income inclusive of an imputation
for leisure, by means of the equation
L(1961)J =U[C(t),L(t)], (1)
where 1961 is the base year. We can solve for explicitlyif we
know the exact form of the utility function; otherwise we can use the
evidence about wage rates to approximate C(t). Expand
L(1961)] in a Taylor series around U[C(t), L(t)] and ignore all but
the first three terms:
U[e(t), L(1961)]= (2)
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Since L(1961)]U[C(t), L(t)] by definition, and since
UL/UC is the real wage, we have
C(t) + wage (t)[L(t) —L(1961)], (3)
all terms of which may be estimated from market data. This formula
may be contrasted with Nordhaus and Tobin's formula variant A which is
C(t)+ wage(1961) [17 —L(t)]. (4)
The contrast between the imputations represented by formulas (3)
and (4) may be seen in an extension of the example used above. Sup-
pose we are measuring economic growth between 1951 and 1971 using
1961 as the base year. Real wages per hour were $4 in 1951, $9 in 1961,
and $36 in 1971, hours worked were 10, 8, and 6 and incomes per day
were $40, $72, and $216.
Without any imputation for leisure the ratio of incomes in 1971 and
1951 is about five (216 ±40).Nordhaus and Tobin's imputation re-
duces the ratio to about three [216 + (9 x11)1±[40+ (9 X 7)].
The alternative imputation of equation (3) increases the ratio of incomes
to nine [216 + (2 x36)]÷ [40 —(2x4)].
The Nordhaus and Tobin imputation, the exact form of the alternative
imputation, and the approximate form of the alternative imputations are
illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows the representative consumer's
choice between income (without the imputation) and leisure. Through
the point on the leisure axis representing 0 hours of work are drawn
three straight lines the slopes of which are equal to the real wages in
1951, 1961, and 1971. The representative consumer, three of whose
indifference curves are illustrated, chooses points A, B, and C in 1951,
1961, and 1971. Nordhaus and Tobin's imputation amounts to projecting
A, B, and C onto a line representing an assumed minimum of seven
hours of leisure or an assumed maximum of 17 hours of work. Their
measure of the ratio of incomes in 1951 and 1971 is I/H, where each
letter stands for the distance of the corresponding point from the
horizontal axis. The exact form of the alternative measure is G/D,
where G is indifferent to C and D is indifferent to A, and G and D cor-
respond to 8 hours of work. The approximate form of the alternative
measure is F/E, where F and E are incomes that the representative
consumer would have had in 1951 and 1971 if he worked eight hours
in both years. One cannot say a priori which of the ratios G/D and
F/E is the larger, but F/E is necessarily larger than I/H.
The effect of the alternative imputation on Nordhaus and Tobin's re-
4.Income (dollars per day)
FIGURE 1
Imputations for Leisure
Wage ($ per hour)
Work (hrs. per day)
Income ($ per day)
(All sums of money are corrected for changes in the price level.)
Estimates of the ratio of incomes per head in 1971 and 1951:
a. According to Nordhaus and Tobin,
I/H =[216+ (9 X 11)1 ÷ [40 + (9 X 7)] =3.06.
b. According to the approximate form of the alternative imputation,
F/E =[216+ (2 X 36)1 ÷ [40 —(2X 4)1 =9.00.
c. According to the exact form of the alternative imputation,
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suits is shown in Table 1, which is intended as an addition to their Table
1. The alternative imputation should be read into Table 1 as variant D
of lines 6 and 16. As I have made no distinction between leisure and non-
market work, Table 1, line 7, variant D would be zero in all years. All
of the data in the accompanying table are from Nordhaus and Tobin's
paper, as explained in the notes on sources. No imputation is required in
variant D for housekeeping or for schoolwork because it has been
assumed that hours of work of people engaged in these occupations have
remained constant over time. The table itself should be self-explanatory,
and the point to emphasize is the contrast in the growth rates of MEW
between variants A and D, which are directly comparable in their as-
sumptions about the productivity of labor in nonmarket activity and
leisure. Variant A of Nordhaus and Tobin, Table 1, line 1 6a, entails a
ratio of real incomes per head in 1965 and 1929 of only 1.14 while
variant D in the accompanying table entails a ratio of 1.98. A com-
parable difference would be found between the alternative imputation
and the Nordhaus and Tobin imputations variant B or C if an alternative
were constructed embodying the assumptions of variant B or C about
labor productivity in nonmarket activity and leisure.
To sum up, we have contrasted two ways of imputing for leisure in a
measure of economic growth. One way is to treat leisure as an additional
commodity, and the other is to say the leisure itself is not part of income
but that there should be imputed to income each year a sum sufficient to
compensate the representative consumer for changes in leisure since the
base year. The latter method requires no imputation if hours of work
have remained unchanged, that is, if the ceterus paribus assumption we
make in ignoring leisure is true.
The alternative imputation preserves the analogy between real in-
comes of the representative consumer at different periods of time and
the spectrum of personal incomes at a moment of time. In abandon-
ing that analogy, the Nordhaus and Tobin imputation opens the meas-
ure of economic growth to more speculation than most of us would
find acceptable. For, if new commodities are to be introduced, why stop
at leisure? Why not reduce the growth rate still further by imputing
for friendship, or the love of God? The alternative measure gets
around this problem by lumping all these intangibles into the ceterus
paribus of utility analysis and by supposing that the love of God, for
instance, is about the same in each year in the income comparison.
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EDWARD F. DENIs0N, The Brookings Institution
Nordhaus and Tobin introduce leisure into their measure of economic
welfare (MEW) but make no explicit allowance for the real cost of work.
They introduce leisure by adding its value in 1958 prices to net national
product valued in 1958 prices. They provide two alternative measures
of the value of leisure in 1958 prices.
Variant A is relatively straightforward. It regards the value of an hour
of leisure in 1958 prices as always equal to the hourly wage in 1958.
This value is multiplied by the number of hours of leisure each year to
obtain the total value of leisure in 1958 prices. Once the 1958 value is
established, leisure is thus treated as an output component just like
loaves of bread or numbers of haircuts. Since the per capita quantity of
leisure has scarcely changed, the effect is to add a large constant value
to per capita NNP, which reduces the growth rate of an index of per
capita welfare.
Variant C uses the same procedure for 1958, but in every other year
the value of an hour of leisure in 1958 prices is different. It is the amount
of goods valued in 1958 prices that could have been bought each year
by the hourly wage (in current prices) that year. This seems analogous
to measuring the bread component of NNPin,say, 1929 not by the
number of loaves of bread purchased in 1929 but by the number of hair-
cuts that could have been purchased in 1929 by the expenditure that
was made for loaves of bread in 1929. Nordhaus and Tobin prefer this
variant, justifying its use by introducing the assumption that efficiency
in the enjoyment of leisure has risen at the same rate as efficiency in the
production of marketable goods and services as a whole. The basis for
such an assumption is flimsy, and I prefer a method, such as their
method A, that assigns the same value to an hour of leisure every year.
When leisure is valued as in variant C, its addition to marketed output
scarcely changes the growth rate.
The point of this comment is not to express a preference for variant A.
Rather it is to ask whether the approach adopted even in variant A does
not start from a wrong premise and yield the wrong results. To pose the
question in its bluntest terms, have not Nordhaus and Tobin added when
they should have subtracted or divided?
Their calculation assumes that the hourly wage measures the price that
was required to induce an individual to give up one hour of leisure andIs Growth Obsolete? 547
to work one hour instead. But if this is so, the wage cannot measure the
value of an hour of leisure. Rather, it is the sum of the values of two
amounts. One is the utility of one hour passed in any way except work-
ing in gainful employment—not just any hour, but the nonwork hour
with the smallest utility of all such hours, since that is the hour that
would rationally be given up. The second is the disutility of one hour
passed in gainful work—not just any hour, but the work hour with the
greatest disutility. It is the last hour of work, which our nineteenth cen-
tury predecessors aptly called "the most onerous hour" because fatigue
and boredom have reached their peak.
Suppose we find a man working for pay 45 hours of the week, and
consequently not so working the remaining 123 hours. We might ask him
two questions. (1) "Suppose we could shorten the week from 168 to
167 hours and cut your nonworking hours from 123 to 122 while leaving
your work time unchanged at 45 hours. You are free to take the lost
hour from time you spend sleeping, doing housework, playing, or any-
thing you like, or to subtract a few minutes from each activity. What
would you pay us not to do this?" (2) "Suppose we could shorten the
week by one hour and cut one hour from your work time, reducing it
from 45 to 44. What would you pay us to do so?" The answer to the first
question would value the marginal utility of an hour of nonworking time
while the answer to the second question would value the marginal dis-
utility of one hour of working time. The sum of the man's answers to the
two questions should equal his hourly wage if he were in equilibrium
(and if, in addition, he were free to choose his hours, and if his output
per hour were unaffected by the number of hours he works).
The value of the utility of the marginal nonworking hour so obtained
in 1958 could then be multiplied by the number of nonworking hours to
obtain the value of nonworking hours in 1958 prices, a calculation simi-
lar to the Nordhaus-Tobin variant A calculation for leisure. But it is
probable that this value, per hour, is small and that the addition would
be only a small fraction of the variant A addition. It is my impression
that the bulk if not all of the wage rate has traditionally, and rightly, been
regarded as recompense for the disutility of the most onerous hour.
MEW must take account of the disutility of work, or more generally,
of real costs, in addition to the value of leisure. The total value of the dis-
utility of work in 1958 prices is the product of its 1958 value per hour
and the number of hours worked each year. To complete a calculation of
real costs, we might follow Jevons and add the cost of abstinence from
consumption, perhaps obtained as the product of the capital stock and
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the 1958 rate of return. We might then proceed to obtain MEW by sub-
tracting real costs from positive welfare items.' But this is not very con-
venient because total real costs in 1958 would approximate the value of
marketable output so that MEW in the base year would approximate
zero, except for values placed on nonmarketed output. In later years, to
be sure, we would obtain a positive number (because of rising produc-
tivity) and in earlier years a negative number, so this procedure is not
nonsensical. But the results do not lend themselves to transformation
into index form and are difficult to interpret. A more interesting pro-
cedure would be to divide real costs into output, rather than to subtract
them, in order to obtain a measure of output in constant prices per unit
of real cost. Either procedure would yield results very different from
those Nordhaus and Tobin obtain.
This comment refers, of course, only to the starting point for a calcula-
tion. I have ignored all the real problems, such as those associated with
the fact that switching an hour from work to nonwork involves different
values when working hours are 44 than when they are 45, and that most
people do not work at all in gainful employment and hence have no
wage to subdivide as a starting point for a calculation.
JOHN R. MEYER, National Bureau of Economic Research and Yale Uni-
versity
In many ways it is difficult to play the role of constructive critic or
discussant of these papers. Among other difficulties—as this conference
has amply shown—the topics do tend to generate emotions. And to be
only critical would be to miss what is basic in these papers: posing ex-
tremely important questions and, even more to their credit, providing at
least partial answers to some.
There is, moreover, more than a little element of boldness, or even
courage and heroism, in these undertakings. In recent years our pro-
fession often has tended to address its professional talents more to ques-
tions that were fairly easily answered by the existing or established tools,
rather than addressing those which seemed most relevant. Even more
disturbingly, certain of our numbers have come dangerously close of late
to suggesting that even to be intellectually curious about certain difficult
'Most of this subtraction, representing the real cost of labor, would corre-
spond to the amount which Nordhaus and Tobin now add,becauseper capita
hours of work are not far from a constant.
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questions, in particular measurement, constitutes a grave disservice to
economics as a science.
These worries, I feel, represent a gross misunderstanding of what the
real issues are. For example, the issue has sometimes been posed as:
"Should GNP measure social welfare?" To my knowledge, no responsible
professional has even suggested anything of the kind. Insofar as de-
termining the potential contribution of GNP to improved social measure-
ment, the usual issue, rather, has been whether we can derive from GNP
certain indexes or concepts that might better measure economic welfare.
Accordingly, Nordhaus and Tobin do not speak about constructing a
measure of social welfare but rather of the possibility of constructing
one of macroeconomic welfare.
Once posed properly, certain other false issues also quickly disappear.
For example, I again know of no competent professional who seriously
advocates early, prompt, or, in most cases, even long-term abandonment
of GNP measures. Nor do many competent professionals even suggest
ignoring GNPI Rather, the prevailing or almost unanimous opinion, as
Nordhaus and Tobin take great pains to point out, is that GNP clearly
has an established position and isa useful measure "for short-run
stabilization policy and for assessing the economy's long-run progress as
a productive machine." As I read this, this is a strong appeal to keep the
GNP accounts, more or less as now constituted, separate and available.
Or, another way of putting much the same point is to observe that a
multiplicity of measures may well be needed to meet modern policy re-
quirements. And why should that surprise us as our economy and policy
concerns become ever more complex?
Indeed, about the closest that any professional critics have come to
suggesting some major alteration in GNP for traditional purposes is to
point out (as do also those insisting that GNP should not be changed)
that the really strong aspect of GNP is its use as a measure of market-
oriented activity. Accordingly, some critics have suggested that certain
GNP imputations now made for nonmarket sectors might be usefully
excluded. Certainly it is a suggestion worth consideration. Among other
possibilities it might reduce the confusion about the meaning and intent
of GNP as a measure. On the other hand, I can see strong arguments
for not undertaking this kind of a "purification" quickly or lightly since
GNP as now measured, even with all of its acknowledged imperfections
or even minor inconsistencies, is a measure that is well-established and
reasonably well-understood. Furthermore, GNP is often the only reason-
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to an important or even paramount role for macroeconomic policy de-
cisions.
Indeed, it is these very qualities—of availability, reliability, and ac-
ceptance—that lead Nordhaus and Tobin to an analysis of how these
numbers might be rearranged, modified, or augmented so as to provide
better insights on other (i.e., nonstabilization) issues of considerable
concern to society, specifically whether and to what extent the economic
welfare of our society has been improving or deteriorating over recent
years. Certainly, this is not a question without considerable interest.
Furthermore, it does not take a seer of unusual talents to predict that
it is likely to be an issue of increasing concern.
The essential question, therefore, to pose about the Nordhaus-Tobin
effort is: Have they succeeded in constructing a measure of macroeco-
nomic welfare that is superior to those implicit or explicit in existing
accounts, particularly that of net national product per capita? My own
view would be that the jury should still be out. Following the lead of the
authors and using admittedly quite subjective considerations, I would
suggest focusing on periods when MEW per capita and NNP per capita
go in opposite directions. I thus find it encouraging that their index
(using actual MEW per capita and their "preferred" variant B) rose
(from 121.4 to 123.2) between 1945 and 1947 even though per capita
NNP declined (on an index basis from 155.4 to 131.9) in those years.
On the other hand, I find it somewhat disconcerting by my lights that
their measure of per capita economic welfare remains very stable or even
rises between 1929 and 1935 (the index of MEW variant B actually
goes from 100.0 to 108.0) while the NNPpercapita index declined by
roughly one-quarter (from 100.0 to 78.0) during those same years.
As for the years since 1947, which are recent and therefore also of
special interest, I am not quite sure which measure is better, per capita
MEW or per capita NNP. The differences are actually slight (at least
between NNPandmost of the MEW series). My subjective guess would
be that NNP is slightly the better welfare index over this period. The
actual MEW variant B index rises from 123.2 in 1947 to 141.8 in 1965
while the NNPpercapita index goes from 131.9 to 187.5. My "feel" or
intuition would be that the truth is somewhere in between, i.e., that the
postwar years were rather better than suggested by the MEW index.
Quite obviously, the next question to ask is why the Nordhaus-Tobin
MEW fails when it does (at least by my subjective valuations). For the
thirties I suspect that the answer is fairly obvious. In those depression
-1
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years,MEW overvalues leisure or undervalues the deterioration in hu-
man capital. Much of the leisure of the thirties perhaps merited a nega-
tive entry. A considerable improvement in MEW might be achieved by
incorporating current research aimed at better measuring human capital,
say along lines being pursued by Jacob Mincer or the Ruggleses. In
short, Nordhaus and Tobin have focused the issue well, but a good deal
still needs to be done on refining the actual measures.
As for my suspicion that MEW per capita may have been a slightly
inferior measure to NNPofeconomic welfare after 1947, one might
attribute this to increased defense expenditures. On defense, the Nord-
haus-Tobin argument is that these are regrettables because increased out-
lays over the years have not clearly bought us more security. If true, this
argument would seem to hold best for the post-1947 years. Certainly, it
seems easier to accept the argument for the years after 1947 than for the
years between 1929 and 1947.
Alternatively, I would suggest that the explanation for the post-1947
"softness" in MEW may reside in the treatment of disamenities. Specifi-
cally, the Nordhaus-Tobin regressions may overestimate any post-1947
increase in disamenities of urban life, mainly because of structural mis-
specificatioii. For one thing the selection processes of migration normally
result in younger, more energetic, and more intelligent members of the
work force drifting from rural to urban areas. Thus, a potentially im-
portant missing variable from their county income regressions may be a
measure of JO or intelligence qualities. To very crudely check for this
possibility I reran some very simple, but quite standard, income de-
termination equations using the NBER-Thorndike-Air Force sample,
which is the only one that I know of which provides an opportunity to
control for intelligence differentials by geographic area. My preliminary
results show that those in this sample who originated in large (over 1
million) cities do have significantly higher incomes than those who did
not. (The t-ratio for the city size dummy is 2.8.) I also hope to check
for the relationship between current place of residence and income using
this same sample, but time was not sufficient to do the necessary coding.
Actually, place of origin may be a better control for quality of education
or of opportunity than a measure or proxy of the urban disamenity
effects that Nordhaus-Tobin seek; thus, without a size measure for cur-
rent residence, it probably measures both disamenity and opportunity
influences. I should add that the intelligence measure variable is indeed
significant as a determinant of income (the highest t-ratio of any included
variable) and is positively correlated with the large city dummy; accord-552 Amenities and Disamenities of Economic Growth
ingly, some room for improvement in the Nordhaus-Tobin specification
almost surely exists.
In general, my own hypothesis about the so-called disamenities of
urban living would be rather different from that implicit in Nordhaus
and Tobin. Specifically, I would guess that the relationship between
urban density or population to well-being is nonlinear. Specifically, peo-
ple may prefer living in urban centers of small to medium size and den-
sity rather than living at either extreme, e.g., very small towns, farms, or
very large cities. Also, as a first approximation, I would hypothesize that
substantial disamenities of urban living do not appear sharply until rela-
tively high net densities and a total conurbation population of more than
2 or 3 million is achieved. This, in turn, suggests that some measure of
maximum "point" (e.g., a census tract) density in a county might be
a useful additional variable in the Nordhaus-Tobin regressions. Actually,
there is some accumulating evidence that Americans seem to prefer living
in cities of approximately 50,000 to 500,000 population and, corre-
spondingly, some recent trend for new work opportunities to locate in
such cities.
In addition, one might hypothesize that suburban living and working
are deemed more attractive than doing either in the central city. Cer-
tainly, suburban wages are commonly somewhat lower than in the cen-
tral cities of many SMSA's, thus suggesting less disamenity by the Nord-
haus-Tobin test. Accordingly, the substantial increase in suburban work
opportunities during the 1950's and 1960's could have led to some de-
crease in total disamenities experienced if Nordhaus and Tobin had
differentiated between suburbs and central c:ties as well as, rnore grossly,
between rural and urban areas. Furthermore, the rise in suburban living
opportunities may have made the rural-urban disamenity premium less
in 1960 than in earlier years so that the Nordhaus-Tobin assumption of
a constant disamenity premium over the period could well misstate the
changes over time, particularly from 1947 on.
Indeed, my guess would be that there may have been an over-all
decrease in urban disamenities during the postwar period. This would
mean that the urban "disamenities" correction (line 5c in Table A-17)
should well have been less in 1965 and rather more in 1947. The dis-
amenities correction is, of course, relatively small (about —$19.1 billion
in 1947 and —$34.6 billion in 1965) but it is not trivial. For example,
if these disamenities corrections were simply reversed for these years, the
actual MEW variant B index per capita would have been more expansive
and thus behaved more like NNP in the postwar period.
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The Leontief paper deals with some of the same issues as Nordhaus
and Tobin but is less concerned with valuation as such. Leontief concen-
trates instead on constructing a tool to better characterize and analyze
relationships between ordinary or regular market activities and pollution.
However, he does suggest a highly imaginative interindustry framework
for evaluating or attaching costs to antipollution efforts at the margin. As
such, he provides us with at least a primitive tool for attaching "shadow
prices" to antipollution programs. The major limitation, as recognized
by Leontief, is not uncommon to interindustry tables: their implicit tech-
nological rigidity. In the particular case of pollution this is somewhat
disturbing since there is much to suggest that various kinds of antipollu-
tion policies, such as effluent charges or more rigid regulation of per-
missible levels of pollution, would induce industry to use production
techniques that result in less pollution per unit of product or service
rendered.
There are, of course, some fairly straightforward means of meeting
these difficulties. As Leontief points out, one would be to add alternative
columns of input-output coefficients to represent alternative production
possibilities. This, in turn, suggests mathematical programming to in-
vestigate the relative efficiency of these alternatives. Indeed, a program-
ming approach would seem to be potentially quite useful in investigating
the implications of such basic policy alternatives for dealing with pollution
as those of subsidy vs. effluent charges or regulatory standards. These
alternatives, moreover, should be readily representable in a programming
approach, e.g., effluent charges would suggest different prices or costs
associated with different activities while the regulatory standard might be
represented by different constraints.
In sum, these papers focus on important questions and even if they
do not give us all the answers, they certainly suggest some of the re-
search that will be needed to achieve better answers. As such, they repre-
sent a very considerable improvement over much previous public or even
professional discourse. Certainly, professional economists should not be
tolerant of misguided public criticism of GNPbecauseGNPdoesnot do
what it was never intended to do, i.e., measure social welfare. On the
other hand, I also believe that our tolerance should not be terribly high
for those who suggest, even by implication, that we should not investi-
gate, as intensively and open-mindedly as our resources and intellectual
qualities permit, the extent to which the tools of economics might be
applicable or inapplicable to questions of welfare measurement. We
should not be concerned, moreover, that this curiosity may sometimes
b-.....
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challenge long-established traditions or measures, though we surely
should not abandon these lightly either.
REPLY BY NORDHAUS AND TOBIN
DENISON AND USHER
Both Denison and Usher direct their comments to the valuation of
leisure. Their emphasis is natural, because difficult conceptual issues are
involved and substantial quantitative differences are at stake.
We regard all our quantitative estimates as extremely tentative, and
especially the leisure components. To begin with, the data on allocation
of time are inadequate. We derived them from a single benchmark sur-
vey. What is needed is a periodic sample survey of household uses of
time. What is happening to hours spent in preparing meals, laundering,
and cleaning; in do-it-yourself repair and construction; in child care; in
commuting? Is it really true, as we assumed, that the number of hours in
nonmarket productive activity, as distinguished from recreational leisure,
has remained constant? Or has the increase in the household capital-labor
ratio released time for leisure activities? A careful survey might enable
us to distinguish better among leisure, home production, and uses of time
that do not contribute to household utility either directly or indirectly.
Even with improved data, difficult conceptual issues will remain. In
discussing them here, we will ignore the distinction of our paper between
household work and leisure proper and refer to both as "leisure." mci-
dentally, Denison is incorrect in attributing to us a preference for variant
C, our most optimistic procedure. Our expressed preference was for
variant B, which assumes that the productivity of work at home has in-
creased with the real wage while the yield of leisure proper has remained
constant.
One conceptual issue is how to count leisure in estimating the absolute
increments of total consumption between two dates. The contribution of
leisure is obviously greater if technical progress is assumed to have aug-
mented leisure time (variant C) than if an hour of leisure time is assumed
always to be the same hour, no more, no less (variant A). Denison
seems to believe it is more likely less than more. Unfortunately no one
can marshal arguments much above the level of anecdote and casual
empiricism on either side of this debate. Perhaps careful detailed surveys
of time allocation, repeated periodically, could enable us to do better.
An even more difficult conceptual issue arises in estimating the relative1
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growthof total consumption between two dates. Once we agree on how
to estimate the absolute increment in total consumption, we have the
numerator. But what is the right denominator? What is the proper esti-
mate of total consumption in the base period? Both Usher and Denison
think that the procedures of our paper overstate base-period consump-
tion and therefore understate the rate of growth.
Usher objects to the fact that if, as in variant A, the value of an hour
of leisure is assumed not to have increased, inclusion of leisure in a con-
sumption index is almost bound to diminish the estimated rate of in-
crease. This will happen whenever the percentage increase in leisure is
smaller than the percentage increase in consumption. The greater the
amount of nonwork time assigned to leisure, rather than to maintenance
items such as sleep, the more likely is this result. Usher correctly points
out that this assignment is arbitrary. His solution is extreme—do not
count leisure in base-period income. On the other hand, our estimates of
percentage growth in leisure, and in consumption inclusive of leisure,
would have been even smaller if we had used 24 hours instead of 18
hours as the day to allocate among welfare-generating activities. We
chose 18 hours as the available time simply because this was the way the
sample study was designed.
Usher's preferred procedure is to add to the increment in market con-
sumption the value—imputed at the wage rate—of any increase in leisure
at the expense of work. We have no quarrel with this estimate of the
absolute increase in total consumption. But Usher uses only the base-
year value of market consumption as the denominator in calculating the
percentage increase in total consumption. His exclusion of leisure from
base-period income is not a procedure that could logically be repeated
in successive calculations. Once the year 1950 has been credited with
leisure equal to reduction in hours of work since 1929, it is hardly possi-
ble to pretend that there was no leisure in 1950 in calculating the relative
gain of 1965 over 1950.
Denison also regards our base-period consumption as too large, but
for a different reason. He raises the interesting and difficult question of
the disutility of work itself, a question we explicitly finessed. The real
wage measures the sum of the marginal disutility of work and the mar-
ginal utility of leisure, both relative to the marginal utility of market con-
sumption. There is no observed variable that enables us to decompose
the real wage into these two components. We explicitly assumed the
marginal disutility of work was zero. If it is really positive, then at least
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unpleasantness of work, and the net contribution to welfare from work-
ing is smaller than wage income. The procedure of our paper, therefore,
by exaggerating the value of base-period consumption, understates the
percentage growth of welfare.
Denison comes close to asserting that the wage rate represents exclu-
sively the marginal disutility of work, or at least did so in some base
year, like 1958. We do not see the empirical basis for this assertion, or
for Denison's evident belief that traditional economic theory regards the
wage wholly as compensation for the unpleasantness of work rather than
for leisure foregone.'
We now realize that the estimation of percentage gains and rates of
growth is even more arbitrary than we originally understood. We have
two unobservable strategic quantities—the rate of augmentation of
leisure time, and the marginal disutility of work. Here is the algebra of
the problem:
Let R1,andbe total hours, leisure hours, and work hours, all
during period 1. Let Vg be the wage rate, andthe leisure-augmentation
factor. Take A0 =1.Note that R1 =R0=R.In each period the con-
sumer is to maximize, with respect to his utility =
R — We). The condition for the maximum at time 0 is:
(1)
where U2/U1 is the marginal utility of leisure in terms of goods and
—U3/U,the marginal disutility of work in terms of goods. Here is the
linear approximation of the gain in utility, time t compared to base-period
0:
AU =U[v1W1,(R — —U[v0W0,(R —W0),W0J
= —voW0)+ U,[(R — —(R—W0)]
+ —W0).
1Denisongoes even further—or one might say further backward in the history
of economic thought toward "real cost" doctrine—in suggesting a symmetrical
proposition for capital incomes, that they represent compensation for the pain of
abstinence, rather than the opportunity cost of current consumption. In this way
Denison reaches the conclusion that the net utility value of all production and
exchange is zero. Wages just pay for the pain of work, property incomes for the
pain of waiting. At least this was so in 1958. Denison intimates that productivity
gains may have made positive contributions since then, though he does not discuss
the implication that net welfare was negative before 1958.
kIsGrowth Obsolete? 557
Somemanipulation shows that:
AUU1Wt(vt —v0)+ U2(R — —1)
+ —W0)— —W0)+ —W0).
By (1) the last three terms sum to zero. Hence the gain in utility is
AU = —v0)+ U2(R — —1). (2)
To convert this into an equivalent amount of market consumption we
divide by the marginal utility of such consumption, U1, and we obtain
(R— —1).
Now we have several cases:




The denominator, base-period consumption, inclusive of leisure, is un-
ambiguously the equivalent of Rv0 of market consumption. Therefore the
proportionate gain is, as in our variant A:
(4a)
R v0
b. Augmentation of Leisure; No Marginal Disutility of Work.
= —v0)+ v0(R — —1), (3b)
and the proportionate gain is:
+ C)
V0 it
If —1=(vt—vo)/vo,we have the result of variant C of our paper.
The proportionate increase in welfare is equal to the increase in the real
wage rate.
c. No Augmentation of Leisure, Positive Marginal Disutility of Work.
The absolute gain, measured in market consumption, is the same as (3a):
AU= —vo). (3c)558Amenities and Disamenities of Economic Growth
But now it is not obvious what the denominator should be. One candi-
date, as before, is Rv0. But another candidate is the "net" consumption:
17/ ID TI/U2 U3
rr0V0 + — +vr0
= W0v0+(R — =
The first candidate values all the time available at the market wage of
the base period. The second candidate values the time at the net wage,
i.e., the market wage minus the marginal disutility of work. The first




d. Augmentation of Leisure, Positive Marginal Disutility of Work.
= —v0)+ — —1).(3d)
This is smaller than (3b). Thus the assumption of our paper that mar-
ginal disutility of work is zero may exaggerate the absolute increment
of welfare. Technological progress has the effect of giving the repre-
sentative consumer additional leisure. He gets it even if he does not
reduce his hours of work. How should this extra leisure be valued? The
wage rate, used in (3b), overvalues the gift to the extent that the wage
is compensation for disutility of work. Indeed, if that is all the wage rep-
resents, the augmentation of leisure has no value at all.
Moreover, we have the same ambiguity about the denominator as in
the previous case. If Rv0 is used, relative gain is greater than (4a),
smaller than (4b). If R[v0 + (U3/U1)J is used, relative gain is
Vt —v0 (R — 4d + + R
—
Thisis the largest of the several estimates. Although the marginal
disutility of work scales down the value of the incremental leisure,it
scales down the value of base-period time even more.
A summary comparison of alternatives is shown in Table 1. The table
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TABLE 1
Summary of Alternative Measures of Growth
of Consumption Including Leisure
Assumption a Rate of Growth of Welfare Rank
(4a) 1(variantA) (4c-l)J





















a AssumptionI used the gross wage, thus setting initial consumption at v0R. Assump-
tion II uses the net wage, with consumption being R[v0+(U3/U,)J.
Assumes rate of augmentation, X, is equal to rate of growth of real wage rate, v.
discussed above and shows how the magnitudes are ranked (1 showing
the most rapid growth, and so forth). Our preferred variant was variant
A for leisure, which is indeed the most pessimistic, and variant C for
home production. It should be noted that all other variants require
knowledge of the marginal disutility of work.
It will be helpful to visualize the two candidates for denominator.
Imagine indifference surfaces in three-dimensional space with axes rep-
resenting work, leisure, and market consumption. Given the constraint
on time, the consumer is confined to the plane Work + Leisure =Total
hours available. Within this plane he is further constrained by the rela-
tionship: Work X Wage =Marketconsumption. We would like to ob-
tain the market consumption equivalent of the indifference surface he
reaches. One procedure is to stay within both constraining planes, and
follow the tangent line to the maximum market consumption, obtained
by setting leisure equal to zero and work equal to R. This gives the
conventional measure, Rv0. The other procedure is as follows: There
is a plane tangent to the attained indifference surface at the chosen
point. The plane does not represent choices effectively open to the con-
sumer, since it departs from the clock constraint on leisure and work.
Nevertheless we can follow this tangent plane to the market consumption
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axis, where both work and leisure are hypothetically zero, and read off
the height of the intersection. This gives to the denominator the value
R[v0 + (U3/U1)]. Measuring along an axis which the consumer cannot
reach may seem farfetched. But we see no compelling logic in favor
of one approximation over the other.
In Figures 1to 4 we illustrate graphically the four measures just
discussed. In Figure 1,andare the chosen work, leisure, and con-
sumption points in the two periods.is the estimate of the increment
of consumption, or the numerator. Da is the estimate of the equivalent
market value of the base-period consumption, the denominator.
In Figure 2, the augmentation of leisure is represented by shifting
FIGURE 1






Rv,Is Growth Obsolete? 561
FIGURE 2








tation is added to N0. Therefore, the numerator, Nb,islarger than in
Figure 1, while the denominator is the same.
In Figure 3 the dashed curve RA represents the marginal disutility of
work(in market consumption units)timesthehoursofwork,
—W(U3/U1). The slope of a line from R to the dashed curve at
W =W0is the marginal disutility of work in the base period. Subtract-
ing an allowance for this disutility reduces the denominator to
In Figure 4, the calculation of the denominator follows Figure 3.
The augmentation of leisure from pointtois the same as in Fig-
ure 2, but in the valuation of this leisure the wage rate used in Figure




Theupshot of this is that many alternative measures of welfare are
plausible, and that there is no unambiguous answer to the question, how
fast has welfare grown? Nevertheless, until some reasonable method for
measuring utility or the disutility of work has been devised, we see no
plausible alternative to the variants we presented in the original paper.
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FIGURE 3






John Meyer's comments refer mainly to other aspects of our paper, and
call for a separate response. We certainly concur with the main thrust
of his remarks, that much remains to be done.
Meyer does make one point on the valuation of leisure, namely, that
overvaluation of leisure is responsible for our finding that MEW (vari-
ant B) was 8 per cent higher in 1935 than in 1929, a finding which
Meyer regards as counter-intuitive. The 22 per cent decline in NNP per
capita corresponds better to his impression. We did not, of course, count
unemployment as leisure. But we did attribute positive value to time out-
t
is Growth Obsolete? 563
FIGURE 4








564Amenities and Disamenities of Economic Growth
side normal working hours, for the unemployed as well as the employed.
It migbt be argued that the opportunity cost of time is effectively zero
for people who cannot find jobs. We thought it more reasonable to
assume that the unemployed would have chosen the normal amounts of
work and leisure if they could have found jobs at the prevailing wages.
But we stressed in the original paper, and we stress again now, that
MEW is designed for secular rather than cyclical comparisons.
Meyer also suggests that allowance should be made for depreciation
of human capital during the Depression, nonuser cost, so to speak. We
accept in general the point that experience as well as education should
be reckoned in human capital. But this cannot affect the NNP-MEW
comparison, because neither concept makes such an allowance.
As Meyer points out, the disamenity calculations need to be refined
in a number of directions: (1) Cross-sectional regressions should be
run for various census dates; the disamenity premium of urban living
may have changed. (2) At least some of the variables in the regressions
should refer to finer geographical areas than our counties. (3) Nonlinear
relationships and threshold effects should be examined. Meyer also sug-
gests that higher incomes in cities may reflect the higher intelligence of
urban residents rather than any compensation for disamenities. It would
indeed be desirable to add intelligence to the variables we used to con-
trol for nongeographical sources of income differentials. The calculations
Meyer reports do not tell us whether controlling for intelligence would
increase or decrease our disamenity estimates.